Decision Points former US president George W Bush about Pakistan

More than 1,400 Pakistan soldiers were killed in the war against terrorism, former US president George W Bush writes in his autobiography titled “Decision Points” which hit the stalls in the US last week. He quotes General Pervez Musharraf as reminding him often that Pakistani forces paid a high price for taking on the extremists. Bush writes that “in return for Pakistan’s cooperation, we lifted the sanctions, designated Pakistan a major non-Nato ally and helped its counter terrorism operations. We also worked with the Congress to provide $3 billion in economic aid and opened our markets to more Pakistani goods and services. Over time, it became clear that Musharraf either would not or could not fulfill all his promises. Part of the problem was Pakistan’s obsession with India. In almost all conversations we had, Musharraf accused India of wrongdoings. Four days after the 9/11 attacks, he told me Indians were “trying to equate us with terrorists and are trying to influence your mind”. As a result, the Pakistani military spent most of its resources preparing for war with India. Its troops were trained to wage a conventional battle with India not counter terrorism operation in the tribal areas. The war against extremists came second." “A related problem was that Pakistani forces pursued the Taliban a lot less aggressively than they pursued al Qaeda. Some in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) retained close links with Taliban officials. Others wanted an insurance policy in case America abandoned Afghanistan and India tried to gain influence there. Whatever the reason, Taliban fighters fled Afghanistan’s tribal regions and populated cities like Peshawar and Quetta. In 2005 and 2006, these sanctuaries aided the rise of the insurgency.” “In March 2006, I visited President Musharraf in Islamabad. Our meeting followed a stop in India where Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and I signed an agreement clearing the way for nuclear cooperation between our two countries. The deal was the culmination of our efforts to improve relations between the world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest democracy. I believe India has the potential to be one of America’s closest partners. The nuclear agreement was a historic step because it signaled a new role for the country on the world stage. “The nuclear deal naturally raised concerns in Pakistan. Our ambassador, a remarkable foreign officer named Ryan Crocker, argued strongly that we should also spend the night in Islamabad as a sign of respect. No president had done that since Richard Nixon, thirty-seven years ago. The secret service was anxious, especially after a bombing near the US consulate in Karachi the day before we arrived. But symbolism matters in diplomacy and I wanted to signal that I valued our relationship. At the airport, a decoy motorcade drove to the embassy mostly empty. My chief of protocol Ambassador Don Ensenat took my place in the presidential limo, while Laura and I flew secretly on the Black Hawk helicopter.” “My meetings with Musharraf focused on two overriding priorities. One was his insistence on serving as both, president and top general, a violation of the Pakistani constitution. I pushed him to shed his uniform and govern as a civilian. He promised to do it. But he was not in much of a hurry. I also stressed the importance of the fight against terrorism. “We have to keep these guys from slipping into your country and back into Afghanistan,” I said. “I give you our assurance that we will cooperate with you against terrorism, Musharraf had said. We are totally on board.” “But Musharraf and his military generals were increasingly distracted by a political crisis at home. In March, Musharraf suspended the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan who he feared would rule against him for violating the law by continuing to serve as both president and chief of army staff. Lawyers and democracy advocated a march on the streets. Musharraf responded by declaring a state of emergency, suspending the constitution, removing more judges and arresting thousands of political opponents. Pressure mounted on me to cut ties with Musharraf. I worried that throwing him overboard would add to the chaos. I had a series of frank conversations with him in the fall of 2007. “It looks ugly from here. The image here is that you have always been beaten and thrown in jail,” I said. “I am troubled by the fact that there is no apparent way forward. I strongly suggest that you set a date for free elections, resign from the army and lift the state of emergency. Musharraf made each of these commitments and kept them.” “But Pakistani forces could not handle the Taliban and we had to retake the offensive to avoid bloodshed inside Afghanistan. Finally, I authorised the intelligence community to turn up the pressure on extremists by allowing drone attacks inside Pakistan which was capable of conducting video surveillance and firing laser guided bombs. Many of the details of our actions remain classified. But soon after I gave the orders we started getting the results as they killed several top al Qaeda men on ground.”